本文选自中信出版社2010年5月出版的《跟奥巴马学英语2》一书中《美国总统就通用汽车公司重组一事发表演讲》一文。该书独家收录奥巴马上海演讲、中美经济战略对话演讲以及开罗大学演讲,权威专家解读。
作者孟宪波,男,1969年生于山东省临沂市。学者、资深同声传译译员。毕业于中国外交学院,1993年进入外交部工作。长期从事口、笔译实践与翻译教学。学识渊博、著述颇丰。
Remarks by the President on General Motors Restructuring
Grand Foyer
June 1, 2009
Just over two months ago, I spoke with you in this same spot about the challenges facing our auto industry, and I laid out what needed to be done to save two of America's most storied automakers ——General Motors and Chrysler. These companies were facing a crisis decades in the making, and having relied on loans from the previous administration, were asking for more.
From the beginning, I made it clear that I would not put any more tax dollars on the line if it meant perpetuating the bad business decisions that had led these companies to seek help in the first place. I refused to let these companies become permanent wards of the state, kept afloat on an endless supply of taxpayer money. In other words, I refused to kick the can down the road.
But I also recognized the importance of a viable auto industry to the well-being of families and communities across our industrial Midwest and across the United States. In the midst of a deep recession and financial crisis, the collapse of these companies would have been devastating for countless Americans, and done enormous damage to our economy —— beyond the auto industry. It was also clear that if GM and Chrysler remade and retooled themselves for the 21st century, it would be good for American workers, good for American manufacturing, and good for America's economy.
I decided, then, that if GM and Chrysler and their stakeholders were willing to sacrifice for their companies survival and success; if they were willing to take the difficult, but necessary steps to restructure, and make themselves stronger, leaner, and more competitive, then the United States government would stand behind them.
The original restructuring plans submitted by GM and Chrysler earlier this year did not call for the sweeping changes these companies needed to survive —— and I couldn't in good conscience proceed on that basis. So we gave them a chance to develop a stronger plan that would put them on a path toward long-term viability. The 60 days GM had to submit its revised plans have now elapsed, and I want to say a few words about where we are and what steps will be taken going forward. But before I do, I want to give you an update on where things stand with Chrysler.
When my administration took office and began going over Chrysler's books, the future of this great American car company was uncertain. In fact, it was not clear whether it had any future at all. But after consulting with my Auto Task Force, industry experts, and financial advisors, and after asking many tough questions, I became convinced that if Chrysler were willing to undergo a restructuring and if it were able to form a partnership with a viable global car company, then Chrysler could get a new lease on life.
Well, that more promising scenario has now come to pass. Today, after taking a number of painful steps, and moving through a quick, efficient, and fair bankruptcy process, a new, stronger Chrysler is poised to complete its alliance with Fiat. Just 31 days after Chrysler's Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, a court has approved the Chrysler-Fiat alliance, paving the way for a new Chrysler to emerge from bankruptcy in the next few days.
What happens next is in the hands of their executives, managers, and workers ——as it is for any private company. But what the completion of this alliance means is that tens of thousands of jobs that would have been lost if Chrysler had liquidated will now be saved, and that consumers have no reason at all to worry about a restructuring—— even one as painful as what Chrysler underwent.
And keep in mind —— many experts said that a quick, surgical bankruptcy was impossible. They were wrong. Others predicted that Chrysler's decision to enter bankruptcy would lead to an immediate collapse in consumer confidence that would send car sales over a cliff. They were wrong, as well. In fact, Chrysler sold more cars in May than it did in April, in part because consumers were comforted by our extraordinary commitment to stand behind a quick bankruptcy process. All in all, it's a dramatic —— an outcome dramatically better than what appeared likely when this process began.
Now the situation we found at General Motors was very different from what we found at Chrysler —— largely because GM is a different kind of company. It is much larger and much more complex, with operations all over the globe. In this context, GM's management team ——including its new CEO, Fritz Henderson, its interim chairman, Kent Kresa, and all of their colleagues——have worked ——has worked tirelessly to produce a plan that meets the strict standards I laid out at the beginning: to streamline GM's brands, clean up GM's balance sheet, and make it possible for GM to compete and succeed.
Working with my Auto Task Force, GM and its stakeholders have produced a viable, achievable plan that will give this iconic American company a chance to rise again. It's a plan tailored to the realities of today's auto market; a plan that positions GM to move toward profitability, even if it takes longer than expected for our economy to fully recover; and it's a plan that builds on GM's recent progress in making better cars. As this plan takes effect, GM will start building a larger share of its cars here at home, including fuel-efficient cars. In fact, if all goes according to plan, the share of GM cars sold in the United States that are made here will actually grow for the first time in three decades.
Now, any time a business as large as General Motors goes through a restructuring, it is extremely difficult to find common ground among all of the company's stakeholders. But while the deal that has been worked out is tough, it is also fair. It will require the United Auto Workers to make further cuts in compensation and retiree health care benefits ——painful sacrifices on top of all that they have already done. It will require GM shareholders to give up the remaining value of their shares —— just as they would have had to do in any private restructuring of this kind. And it will also provide unsecured bondholders with an equitable outcome —— an outcome that will let them recover more than the current value of their claims, and substantially more than they would have recovered if the government had not intervened and GM had liquidated. That's why a majority of GM's bondholders already support this deal.