We are also working though the World Trade Organization to address continuing challenges to fair competition. Take government procurement. The purchases that governments make represent an important part of the global economy, and citizens everywhere deserve to know that their governments are getting the best product at the best prices. Consistent with the WTO Government Procurement Agreement that we signed, America lets companies from other nations who have signed that same agreement compete for appropriate American Government contracts. We would naturally expect countries that want access to our government contracts to offer our companies genuine access to theirs in return.

我们还正通过世界贸易组织来努力解决公平竞争不断面临的问题。例如政府采购问题。政府所进行的采购代表着全球经济的重要部分，任何地区的公民均有权知道政府是在以最好的价格购买最佳产品。根据我们签署的世界贸易组织《政府采购协议》,美国允许其他签署了同样协议的国家的公司竞争适宜的美国政府合同。我们当然希望那些想获得我国政府合同机会的国家也真诚地为我们的公司提供竞争对方政府合同的机会。

Across the full spectrum of international institutions—the G8 and G20, the IMF, OECD, ILO, WTO, and others—we are working to level playing fields and encourage robust and fair economic activity. Just as the WTO eliminated harmful tariffs in the 1990s, today we need institutions capable of providing solutions to new challenges, from some activities of state-owned enterprises to the kinds of barriers emerging behind borders.

我们还通过各种国际机构组织——如8国集团、20国集团、国际货币基金组织、经合组织、国际劳工组织、世贸组织等——来努力实现平等的竞争环境，鼓励健全而公平的经济活动。正如上世纪90年代世贸组织废除了有害的关税，今天我们需要有一些机构来提供办法，解决从国有企业的某些活动到境内出现壁垒等新问题。

We also support innovative partnerships that develop norms and rules to address these new concerns. We should build on the model of the Santiago Principles on sovereign wealth funds, which were negotiated jointly by host governments, recipient governments, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the sovereign funds themselves. This code of conduct governing sovereign investment practices has reassured stakeholders — investor nations, recipient nations, and the private sector. And it may prove a useful model for other shared challenges, like ensuring that state-owned companies and enterprises compete on the same terms as private companies.

我们支持有创意的合作关系，针对这些新问题制定标准和规则。我们应借鉴有关主权财富基金的《圣地亚哥原则》模式，这些原则是由东道国政府、接受国政府、世界银行、国际货币基金组织、经合组织以及主权基金等共同谈判而成。管理主权投资活动的行为准则消除了利益相关方——如投资国、接受国、以及私营公司——的疑虑。这对于解决其他共同的问题或许是一个有用的模式，如确保国有公司和企业与民间公司按照同样的规则进行竞争。

As a second step, we are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS, will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of US consumer and industrial exports within five years. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers to reaching new customers.

第二个步骤是，我们将谋求一种新型的贸易协定，使它们在开拓新市场同时，提升公平竞争的标准。例如,《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》,即KORUS，将在5年时间内取消美国 95%的消费品和工业出口产品关税。仅消除关税就能为美国出口产品带来100亿美元以上的增长，并促使韩国经济增长6%。所以，无论是美国机械制造商，还是韩国化学品出口商，这一协定均为获得新客户减少了障碍。

But this trade deal isn't simply about who pays what tariff at our borders. It is a deeper commitment to creating conditions that let both our nations prosper as our companies compete fairly. KORUS includes significant improvements on intellectual property, fair labor practices, environmental protection and regulatory due process.

然而，这项贸易协定并非只涉及谁在我们的边界支付多少关税的问题。它是更深一层的承诺，即创造条件，让两国在彼此公司的公平竞争中走向繁荣。《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》涵盖了在知识产权、公正对待劳工、环保及正当监管程序上的明显改进。

And let me add that the benefits of KORUS extend beyond the economic bottom line. Because this agreement represents a powerful strategic bet. It signals that America and South Korea are partners for the long term—economically, diplomatically, people to people. So, for all these reasons, President Obama is pursuing congressional approval of KORUS, together with necessary Trade Adjustment Assistance, as soon as possible. He is also pursuing passage of the Colombia and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements as well.

让我补充一点——该协定的好处不限于经济底线。它意味着有力的战略性抉择。它标志着，美国与韩国在经济、外交和民间交流领域是长期合作伙伴。因此，奥巴马总统正在谋求国会尽快批准《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》,以及必要的“贸易调整援助”计划。他也在谋求批准与哥伦比亚和与巴拿马的自由贸易协定。

Now, we have learned that, in our system, getting trade deals right is challenging, painstaking work. But it's essential. We consider KORUS a model agreement. Asian nations have signed over 100 bilateral trade deals in less than a decade, but many of those agreements fall short on key protections for businesses, workers, and consumers. There are a lot of bells and whistles, but many of the hard questions are glossed over or avoided.

我们认识到，在我们的体制内，达成适中的贸易协定要通过艰难和痛苦的努力。但它十分重要。我们认为《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》是一个典范协定。在过去不到10年时间内，亚洲国家签署了100多项双边贸易协议，但许多这类协议未能为商家、工人和消费者提供关键性的保护。它们在形式上应有尽有，但忽视或规避了许多艰难的问题。

Beyond that, there is now a danger of creating a hodgepodge of inconsistent and partial bilateral agreements which may lower tariffs, but which also create new inefficiencies and dizzying complexities. A small electronics shop, for example, in the Philippines might import alarm clocks from China under one free trade agreement, calculators from Malaysia under another, and so on—each with its own obscure rules and mountains of paperwork—until it no longer even makes sense to take advantage of the trade agreements at all. Instead, we should aim for true regional integration.

除此之外，现在还存在着另一种危险性，即五花八门、缺乏一致性和完整性的双边协议。这些协议可能降低一些关税，同时却会导致新的低效率与令人眼花缭乱的复杂规定。例如，在菲律宾的一家小型电子产品商店有可能根据一项自由贸易协议从中国进口闹钟，但根据另一项协议从马来西亚进口计算器，以此类推——每一项协议都有其晦涩难懂的规则并需要准备堆积如山的文件——直至这些贸易协议变得毫无意义，其所能提供的益处不复存在。我们的努力方向应当与之相反，即真正实现地区一体化。

That is the spirit behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the so-called TPP, which we hope to outline by the time of APEC in November, because this agreement will bring together economies from across the Pacific—developed and developing alike—into a single trading community.

这就是跨太平洋伙伴关系——简称“TPP”——倡导的精神。我们希望在今年11月亚太经合组织开会时概述它的内容，因为这项协议将汇集整个太平洋地区的各经济体——无论是发达国家还是发展中国家——使之成为一个统一的贸易体。